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Abstract
A policy-based encryption scheme allows to encrypt a message according to a credential-based policy for-
malized as monotone Boolean expression written in standard normal form. The encryption is so that only
the users having access to a qualiﬁed set of credentials for the policy are able to decrypt the message. In
this paper, we ﬁrst revisit the formal deﬁnition of policy-based encryption and describe a policy-based en-
cryption scheme from bilinear pairings. Our scheme improves the one proposed in [2] in terms of ciphertext
size, while at the same time preserving the computational eﬃciency. Then, we describe an application of
policy-based encryption in the context of ad-hoc networks. More precisely, we show how the policy-based
encryption primitive can be used to achieve a privacy-enhanced secure establishment of ad-hoc communities.
Keywords: Bilinear Pairings, Credentials, Ad-Hoc Communities
1 Introduction
The concept of policy-based cryptography, ﬁrst formalized in [2], provides a frame-
work for performing cryptographic operations with respect to policies formalized as
monotone Boolean expressions written in standard normal forms. In particular, a
policy-based encryption scheme allows to encrypt a message with respect to a policy
in such a way that only the users that are compliant with the policy are able to
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decrypt the message. Basically, a policy consists of conjunctions (logical AND oper-
ation) and disjunctions (logical OR operation) of conditions, where each condition
is fulﬁlled by a digital credential representing the signature of a speciﬁc credential
issuer on a certain assertion. A user is thus compliant with a policy if and only if
he has been issued a qualiﬁed set of credentials for the policy i.e. a set of creden-
tials fulﬁlling the combination of conditions deﬁned by the policy. More generally,
policy-based encryption belongs to an emerging family of cryptographic schemes
sharing the ability to integrate encryption with credential-based access structures.
This ability allows for several interesting applications in diﬀerent contexts includ-
ing but not restricted to oblivious access control [2,7,18], trust negotiation [6,11,17],
and cryptographic workﬂow [1].
In the ﬁrst part of this paper (Section 2), we provide a further reﬁnement of the
formalization of the policy-based encryption primitive given [2]. Then, we describe
a policy-based encryption scheme from bilinear pairings. Our scheme improves the
one proposed in [2] in terms of ciphertext size, while at the same time preserving
the computational eﬃciency. Furthermore, in contrast with the heuristic, rather
intuitive security analysis provided in [2], our scheme is supported by formal security
arguments. Due to space limitation, the details of our security analysis are given in
the appendix.
In [14], an ad-hoc network is perceived as a community of interconnected au-
tonomous devices providing services and resources to each other. Such devices
often belong to users from diﬀerent security domains that do not have pre-existing
trust relationships. A security framework is therefore needed to ensure trustworthy
interactions within such kind of communities. A comprehensive policy-based secu-
rity framework supporting the establishment, evolution and management of ad-hoc
networks is proposed in [14]. In the second part of this paper (Section 3), we lever-
age this framework, and show how the policy-based encryption primitive could be
used to achieve a privacy-enhanced secure establishment of ad-hoc communities.
2 Policy-Based Encryption
In this section, we ﬁrst set the context for the policy-based encryption primitive
including the terminology, the notation and the policy model. Then, we provide
a precise deﬁnition for policy-based encryption schemes and describe our pairing-
based scheme. In the appendix, we provide a formal deﬁnition for message conﬁ-
dentiality in the context of policy-based encryption. Then, we prove the security of
our scheme in the random oracle model.
2.1 Setting the Context
The concept of policy-based cryptography considers environments where interac-
tions may occur between entities from diﬀerent security domains without pre-
existing knowledge of each other. Such interactions can involve the exchange of
sensitive resources in which case they need to be carefully controlled through clear
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and concise policies. In the considered environments, the identity of users is rarely
of interest to determining whether a user could be trusted or authorized to con-
duct some sensitive transactions. Instead, statements about the user such as at-
tributes, properties, capabilities and/or privileges are more relevant. The validity of
such statements is checked and certiﬁed by trusted entities called credential issuers
through a digital signature procedure.
Each user that wants to use the policy-based encryption primitive deﬁnes a trust
infrastructure that consists of a set of credential issuers I = {I1, . . . , IN}, where
the public key of Iκ, for κ ∈ {1, . . . , N}, is denoted Rκ while the corresponding
master key is denoted sκ. Any credential issuer Iκ ∈ I may be asked by a user to
issue a credential corresponding to a set of statements. The requested credential
is basically the digital signature of the credential issuer on an assertion denoted
A containing the set of statements as well as a set of additional information such
as the validity period of the credential. Note that the term ”trust infrastructure”
means that the user trusts any credential issuer belonging to I for never issuing
credentials corresponding to invalid assertions.
Upon receiving a request for generating a credential on assertion A, a credential
issuer Iκ ﬁrst checks the validity of the assertion. If it is valid, then Iκ executes
a credential generation algorithm and returns a credential denoted ς(Rκ, A). Oth-
erwise, Iκ returns an error message. Upon receiving the credential ς(Rκ, A), the
requester may check its integrity using Iκ’s public key Rκ. The process of checking
the validity of a set of statements about a certain entity is out of the scope of this
paper. Note that it is implicitly assumed that end users know a trustworthy value
of the public key of each of the credential issuers included in I. Besides, as the
representation of assertions is out of the scope of this paper, note that they will
simply be encoded as binary strings.
We consider credential-based policies formalized as monotone boolean expressions
involving conjunctions (AND / ∧) and disjunctions (OR / ∨) of credential-based
conditions. A credential-based condition is deﬁned through a pair 〈Iκ, A〉 specifying
an assertion A ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a credential issuer Iκ ∈ I that is trusted to check and
certify the validity of A. A user fulﬁlls the condition 〈Iκ, A〉 if and only if he has
been issued the credential ς(Rκ, A).
We consider policies written in standard normal forms, i.e. written either in conjunc-
tive normal form (CNF) or in disjunctive normal form (DNF). In order to address
the two standard normal forms, we use the conjunctive-disjunctive normal form
(CDNF) introduced in [18]. Thus, a policy denoted Pol is written as follows:
Pol = ∧mi=1[∨mij=1[∧mi,jk=1 〈Iκi,j,k , Ai,j,k〉]], where Iκi,j,k ∈ I and Ai,j,k ∈ {0, 1}∗
Under the CDNF notation, policies written in CNF correspond to the case where
{mi,j = 1}i,j , while policies written in DNF correspond to the case where m = 1.
Note. Writing policies in standard normal forms allows us to improve the perfor-
mance of policy-based encryption, both in terms of both computational cost and
bandwidth consumption, as will be shown in subsection 2.3.
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Let ςj1,...,jm(Pol) denote the set of credentials {{ς(Rκi,ji,k , Ai,ji,k)}
mi,ji
k=1 }mi=1, for some
{ji ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}}mi=1. Then, ςj1,...,jm(Pol) is a qualiﬁed set of credentials for Pol.
2.2 Formal Deﬁnition
A policy-based encryption scheme is speciﬁed by ﬁve algorithms: Setup, Issuer-Setup,
CredGen, PolEnc and PolDec which we describe below.
Setup. On input of a security parameter k, this algorithm generates a set of public
parameters P which speciﬁes the diﬀerent parameters, groups and public functions
that will be referenced by subsequent algorithms. Furthermore, it speciﬁes a mes-
sage space M and a ciphertext space C.
Issuer-Setup. This algorithm generates a random master key sκ and the corre-
sponding public key Rκ for credential issuer Iκ ∈ I.
CredGen. On input of the public key Rκ of a credential issuer Iκ ∈ I and an
assertion A ∈ {0, 1}∗, this algorithm returns the credential ς(Rκ, A).
PolEnc. On input of a message M ∈M and a policy Pol, this algorithm returns a
ciphertext C ∈ C representing the encryption of M with respect to policy Pol.
PolDec. On input of a ciphertext C ∈ C, a policy Pol and a qualiﬁed set of
credentials ςj1,...,jm(Pol), this algorithm returns a message M ∈M or ⊥ (for ’error’).
The algorithms described above have to satisfy the standard consistency constraint
i.e.
C =PolEnc(M,Pol) ⇒ PolDec(C,Pol, ςj1,...,jm(Pol)) = M , for some
{ji ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}}mi=1
In the following, we describe a concrete implementation of policy-based encryption
using bilinear pairings over elliptic curves.
2.3 Our Policy-Based Encryption Scheme
Before describing our policy-based encryption scheme, we deﬁne algorithm BDH-
Setup as follows:
BDH-Setup. On input of a security parameter k, generate a tuple (q,G1,G2, e, P )
where the map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 is a bilinear pairing, (G1,+) and (G2, ∗) are two
groups of the same order q, and P is a random generator of G1. The generated
parameters are such that the Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (denoted BDHP) is
hard.
Note-1. We recall that a bilinear pairing satisﬁes the following three properties:
(i) Bilinear: for Q,Q′ ∈ G1 and for a, b ∈ Z∗q , e(a ·Q, b ·Q′) = e(Q,Q′)ab
(ii) Non-degenerate: e(P, P ) = 1 and therefore it is a generator of G2
(iii) Computable: there exists an eﬃcient algorithm to compute e(Q,Q′) for all
Q,Q′ ∈ G1.
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Note-2. BDHP is deﬁned as follows: on input of a tuple (P, a · P, b · P, c · P ) for
randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , compute the value e(P, P )abc. The hardness of BDHP
can be ensured by choosing groups on supersingular elliptic curves or hyperelliptic
curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds and deriving the bilinear pairings from Weil or Tate pairings.
The hardness of BDHP implies the hardness of the so called Computational Diﬃe-
Hellman Problem (denoted CDHP) which is deﬁned as follows: on input of a tuple
(P, a ·P, b ·P ) for randomly chosen a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute the value ab ·P . As we merely
apply these mathematical primitives in this paper, we refer for instance to [12,19]
for further details.
Our policy-based encryption scheme consists of the algorithms described below.
Setup. On input of the security parameter k, do the following:
(i) Run algorithm BDH-Setup to obtain a tuple (q,G1,G2, e, P )
(ii) Let M = {0, 1}n−n0 and C = G1 × ({0, 1}n)∗ (for some n, n0 ∈ N∗ such that
n0  n)
(iii) Deﬁne three hash functions: H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
(iv) Let I = (q,G1,G2, e, P, n, n0,H0,H1,H2)
Issuer-Setup. Let I = {I1, . . . , IN} be a set of credential issuers. Each credential
issuer Iκ ∈ I picks at random a secret master key sκ ∈ Z∗q and publishes the
corresponding public key Rκ = sκ · P .
CredGen. On input of issuer Iκ ∈ I and assertion A ∈ {0, 1}∗, this algorithm
outputs the credential ς(Rκ, A) = sκ ·H0(A).
PolEnc. On input of message M ∈M and policy Pol, do the following:
(i) Pick at random Mi ∈ {0, 1}n−n0 (for i = 1, . . . ,m − 1), then compute Mm =
M ⊕ (⊕m−1i=1 Mi)
(ii) Pick at random ti ∈ {0, 1}n0 (for i = 1, . . . ,m)
(iii) Compute r = H1(M1‖ . . . ‖Mm‖t1‖ . . . ‖tm), then compute U = r · P
(iv) Compute πi,j =
∏mi,j
k=1 e(Rκi,j,k ,H0(Ai,j,k)) (for j = 1, . . . ,mi and i = 1, . . . ,m)
(v) Compute μi,j = H2(πri,j‖i‖j), then compute vi,j = (Mi‖ti) ⊕ μi,j (for j =
1, . . . ,mi and i = 1, . . . ,m)
(vi) Return C = (U, [[vi,j ]mij=1]
m
i=1)
The intuition behind the encryption algorithm PolEnc is as follows: each conjunction
of conditions ∧mi,jk=1 〈Iκi,j,k , Ai,j,k〉 is ﬁrst associated to a mask μi,j that depends on
the diﬀerent credentials related to the speciﬁed conditions. The encrypted message
M is split into m random shares [Mi]mi=1, then for each index i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the
value Mi‖ti is associated to the disjunction ∨mij=1 ∧mi,jk=1 〈Iκi,j,k , Ai,j,k〉, where ti is a
randomly chosen intermediate key. Each value Mi‖ti is encrypted mi times using
each of the masks μi,j . This way, it is suﬃcient to compute any one of the masks μi,j
in order to be able to retrieve Mi‖ti. In order to be able to retrieve the encrypted
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message, an entity needs to retrieve all the shares as well as all the intermediate
keys ti using a set of qualiﬁed credentials for policy Pol.
PolDec. On input of ciphertext C = (U, [[vi,j ]mij=1]
m
i=1), policy Pol, and the qualiﬁed
set of credentials ςj1,...,jm(Pol), do the following:
(i) Compute π˜i,ji = e(U,
∑mi,ji
k=1 ς(Rκi,ji,k , Ai,ji,k)) (for i = 1, . . . ,m)
(ii) Compute μ˜i,ji = H2(π˜i,ji‖i‖ji), then compute (Mi‖ti) = vi,ji ⊕ μ˜i,ji
(iii) Compute r = H1(M1‖ . . . ‖Mm‖t1‖ . . . ‖tm)
(iv) If U = r · P , then return the message M = ⊕mi=1Mi, otherwise return ⊥
The algorithms described above satisfy the standard consistency constraint. In fact,
thanks to the bilinearity property of bilinear pairings, the following holds
π˜i,ji = e(r · P,
mi,ji∑
k=1
sκi,ji,k ·H0(Ai,ji,k)) =
mi,ji∏
k=1
e(sκi,ji,k · P,H0(Ai,ji,k))r = πri,ji
The essential operation in pairing-based cryptography is pairing computations. In
Table 1, we provide the computational costs of our encryption and decryption algo-
rithms in terms of pairing computations as well as the size of the resulting ciphertext.
Note that l1 denotes the bit-length of the bilinear representation of an element of
group G1.
Encryption Decryption Ciphertext Size
Our scheme
Pm
i=1
Pmi
j=1 mi,j m l1 + (
Pm
i=1 mi).n
The scheme of [2]
Pm
i=1
Pmi
j=1 mi,j m l1 + (
Pm
i=1 mi).n + n
The scheme of [6]
Pm
i=1
Pmi
j=1 mi,j
Pm
i=1 mi,ji l1 + (
Pm
i=1
Pmi
j=1 mi,j).n + n
Table 1
Performance of our scheme compared with the schemes of [2] and [6]
In Table 1, we include the costs related to the encryption scheme described in [2] and
the one described in [6]. In fact, the latter is a policy-based encryption scheme when
applied to policies written in standard normal forms following the notation deﬁned
in Section 2. While the three encryption algorithms require the same amount of
pairing computations, our decryption algorithm and the one described in [2] are
more eﬃcient than the one described in [6] because mi,ji ≥ 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Besides, our scheme leads to ciphertexts more compact than the ones given by
the scheme of [2]. Finally, observe that because mi,j ≥ 1 for j = 1, . . . ,mi and
i = 1, . . . ,m, the size of the ciphertexts resulting from the scheme of [2] is at least
as short as the one of the ciphertexts produced by the scheme of [6].
Note-1. As for standard asymmetric encryption schemes, policy-based encryption
schemes are much less eﬃcient than symmetric encryption schemes. In practice,
they should be used to exchange the symmetric (session) keys that are used for
bulk encryption.
Note-2. In some scenarios, a policy may be expressed in terms of a (k, n)-threshold
structure (for 1 < k < n). Our approach oﬀers an advantage over threshold schemes
in that our schemes address general access structures including those for which
W. Bagga et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 107–120112
there exists no corresponding (k, n)-threshold representation (such structures exist
according to Theorem 1 of [4]). Although any threshold structure may be writ-
ten using only ∧ and ∨ operators and thus may match our formalism, we believe
that dedicated threshold schemes (in particular some ID-based threshold decryp-
tion schemes) might handle such structures more eﬃciently and elegantly than our
generic approach.
Note-3. The concept of policy-based cryptography might be compared with the con-
cept of generalized threshold cryptosystems introduced in [16]. Generalized thresh-
old cryptography is an extension of the original threshold cryptography to the case
of general access structures. Our policy-based encryption scheme uses a technique
similar but not exactly the same than the secret sharing method presented in [4].
In [9], it has been observed that using the previous general secret sharing method
it is possible to construct an RSA-based generalized threshold decryption scheme.
In contrast with the RSA-oriented approach, our policy-based encryption scheme
supports the notion of cryptographic workﬂow discussed in [1]. In fact, using our
approach, a message can be encrypted with respect to a speciﬁc access structure be-
fore the decryption keys (the credentials) are generated and given to the authorized
users. As future work, we are planning to conduct a detailed comparison between
policy-based and generalized threshold cryptosystems.
3 Establishment of Ad-Hoc Communities through
Policy-Based Encryption
In [14], Keoh et al. propose a comprehensive policy-based security framework sup-
porting the establishment, evolution and management of ad-hoc networks. In this
section, we ﬁrst provide an overview of their approach. Then, we leverage their
policy-based trust establishment model and show, through the description of an ap-
plication scenario, how the policy-based encryption primitive can be used to achieve
a secure establishment of ad-hoc communities, while adhering to the privacy princi-
ple of data minimization (called the data quality principle in OECD guidelines [8])
according to which only strictly necessary information should be collected for a
given purpose.
3.1 Policy-Based Establishment of Ad-Hoc Communities
In [14], an ad-hoc network is perceived as a community of interconnected au-
tonomous devices providing services and resources to each other. More precisely,
ad-hoc communities are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition. An ad-hoc community interconnects a group of devices, maintains
membership and ensures that only entities, i.e., users or computing services, which
possess certain credentials, attribute information and characteristics can join the
community (common characteristics). The members of the community rely upon
each other to provide services and share resources (interactions). These interactions
are regulated through a set of well-deﬁned rules and policies (law) that govern the
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access to the services and resources in the community.
With regard to their deﬁnition of ah-hoc communities, Keoh et al. introduce a
community speciﬁcation, called doctrine. The latter speciﬁes a set of roles that
can be associated to the participants in the community, the characteristics that
participants must exhibit in order to be eligible to play a speciﬁc role, as well as
the authorization and obligation policies governing the behavior of the participants
within the community depending on their roles. Based on the doctrine, a set of
security protocols is proposed to bootstrap the community, manage the membership
(joining and leaving the community), and govern the access to the services provided
by the participants.
Note. As in [14], we assume throughout this section that there is an underlying
routing infrastructure that supports the relay of data packets in an ad-hoc network.
The characteristics that a participant must fulﬁll in order to be eligible to play
a speciﬁc role in a community are expressed in terms of a credential-based policy,
called user-role policy, that is formalized as monotone Boolean expression written in
a standard normal form. The policy is deﬁned by the entity that initiates the boot-
strapping of the community, and is broadcasted (ﬂooded) to the other participants.
The credentials considered in [14] are public-key certiﬁcates (X.509 certiﬁcates) is-
sued by certiﬁcation authorities and attribute certiﬁcates (SPKI/SDSI) issued by
trusted attribute authorities. As argued in [14], the idea of the proposed approach
is not to establish trusted authorities in mobile ad-hoc networks. On the contrary,
it is assumed that the participants have been already issued various certiﬁcates
during their past connections to the wired environment. Such assumption is admis-
sible in a wide range of application scenarios. For example, consider the case where
the laptops and PDAs of diﬀerent persons interact in an ad-hoc business meeting.
Typically, the interacting devices belong to individuals from multiple domains: em-
ployees of their institutions or companies, members of collaborative projects, etc.
In each domain, the individuals obtain credentials certifying their attributes within
the domain. A credential is basically the signature of the credential issuer on an
assertion that binds an identiﬁer (a public key or a pseudonym) of the credential
owner to the set of statements/attributes whose validity is checked and certiﬁed by
the credential issuer.
Note. First, note that the policy model in [14] is limited to policies written in
the Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) but can naturally be extended to support the
Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). Besides, the trust model relies on a security in-
frastructure that consists of well-established trusted authorities in the Internet. We
can extend this model to support any entity, including the participants themselves,
that is trusted to check and certify the validity of speciﬁc credentials. Finally, note
that it is assumed that the entity that deﬁnes the user-role policy have access to
trusted values of the public keys of the diﬀerent credential issuers referenced in the
policy.
The community bootstrapping and community joining protocols described in [14]
necessitate the veriﬁcation of the compliance of the participants that want to join
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the community with the user-role policies associated to the roles they wish to play
within the community. Such veriﬁcation, as described in [14], involves the exchange
of credentials, checking their validity as well as their compliance with the user-role
policies. For an illustration, consider the scenario described below:
Scenario. Alice is on a business trip for the collaborative project P. On the
train there might be other colleagues from diﬀerent companies working on the same
project. Alice has some documents she is willing to share and possibly discuss only
with the members of the project that are either from company X or from company Y.
Following the approach proposed in [14], Alice deﬁnes a community with a role,
say rp = partner, that allows having access to the proposed documents as well as
initiating a private discussion with Alice. The user-role policy (deﬁned by Alice)
associated to the role rp is:
Polrp =
[〈Company X , Bob is Employee〉 ∨ 〈Company Y , Bob is Employee〉] ∧ 〈Project P , Bob is Member〉
Alice initiates the bootstrapping of the community by ﬂooding her policy Polrp
as well as the privileges granted by role rp. Assume that Bob, who is a member
of the collaborative project P working for company X, is interested in reading the
documents proposed by Alice and potentially having a private discussion with her.
In this case, Bob needs to send a join request to Alice as well as the credentials
proving his compliance with the policy Polrp i.e. his employee credential delivered
by company X and his membership credential delivered by the manager of project P.
Upon receiving Bob’s joining request, Alice ﬁrst checks the validity of his credentials
using the public keys of the credential issuers, then she checks that the received
credentials fulﬁll the policy Polrp . Once the admission conditions are validated,
Bob is assigned a token granting the privileges corresponding to role rp i.e. Bob
can have access to the project’s documents held by Alice and can initiate a private
discussion with Alice.
3.2 Our Approach
In the scenario described above, the main concern of Alice is to ensure that the
participants that are not compliant with the user-role policy Polrp associated to
role rp cannot have the privileges corresponding to rp i.e. they cannot read the
documents proposed by Alice and cannot initiate a private discussion with her. In
other words, Alice wants to be sure that her user-role policy is eﬀectively enforced.
Consider the two use cases described below:
(i) In the ﬁrst case, Bob is interested in reading the documents proposed by Alice.
However, he is not willing to have further interactions with her. According to
the privacy principle of data minimization, the policy enforcement mechanism
should not allow Alice to know whether Bob is compliant with her policy.
(ii) In the second case, after having read Alice’s documents, Bob wants to have
further interactions with her. Alice will know that Bob is compliant with her
policy. However, according to the privacy principle of data minimization, the
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policy enforcement mechanism should not allow Alice to know for which speciﬁc
company Bob is working i.e. Alice should not know the fact that Bob is from
company X.
In the two cases described above, the standard approach proposed in [14] for policy
enforcement cannot respect the privacy principle of data minimization. In fact, be-
cause Bob must provide the credentials proving his compliance with Polrp , Alice will
know anyway whether his is compliant with her policy and from which company he
comes from. More generally, as long as the policy enforcement mechanism involves
the exchange of credentials, the privacy principle of data minimization cannot be
satisﬁed.
The policy-based encryption primitive can be used to enforce the policy of Alice
while respecting the privacy principle of data minimization. In the following, we
describe a simple mechanism that illustrates our approach.
(i) Upon receiving the join request of Bob, Alice generates at random a symmetric
key ks which she uses to encrypt the diﬀerent documents she is willing to share
with Bob if he fulﬁlls the admission policy Polrp . Then, Alice generates at
random a nonce nBob and encrypts the pair (ks, nBob) with respect to the policy
Polrp using a policy-based encryption algorithm (PolEnc). Finally, Alice sends
the resulting ciphertexts to Bob.
(ii) Upon receiving the two ciphertexts, Bob uses his credentials to decrypt the pair
(ks, nBob) using the policy-based decryption algorithm (PolDec) corresponding
to the encryption scheme used by Alice. As Bob has access to a qualiﬁed set
of credentials for policy Polrp , he is able to get the symmetric key ks which he
uses to decrypt the diﬀerent documents he wanted to read. In the case where
there is no further interactions between Alice and Bob, there is no way for
Alice to know that Bob fulﬁlls her policy.
(iii) In the case where Bob is willing to start a private discussion with Alice, he
can send his request with the nonce nBob. The fact that he knows such ran-
dom nonce proves to Alice that Bob was able to decrypt her ciphertexts and
therefore is compliant with her policy. However, as Alice does not know which
speciﬁc credentials were used to decrypt the nonce, she cannot know which
company Bob is working for.
As shown in the simple mechanism described above, the policy-based encryption
primitive allows to enforce the communities’ user-role policies, while adhering to
the privacy principle of data minimization. This is enabled by the fact that, in
contrast with the standard approach where the credentials need to be exchanged,
the credentials are used as decryption keys in policy-based encryption. We are
currently investigating the implementation of a comprehensive security framework
for ad-hoc communities using policy-based encryption that optimizes the overall
number of messages that need to be exchanged between the participants.
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4 Conclusion
The concept of policy-based cryptography is a promising paradigm for trust estab-
lishment and authorization in open environments. In this paper, we focused on
the policy-based encryption primitive. We ﬁrst described a provably secure policy-
based encryption scheme from bilinear pairings that improves the existing schemes
in terms of ciphertext size. Then, we leveraged the security framework proposed
in [14] and showed how policy-based encryption can be used for a privacy-enhanced
enforcement of the user-role policies speciﬁed by ad-hoc communities.
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A Formal Security Analysis
In the following, we provide the details of the security analysis of the policy-based
encryption scheme described in Section 2. We ﬁrst describe a formal model for
message conﬁdentiality adapted to the context of policy-based cryptography. Then,
we state the results related to our scheme and give the details of our reductionist
security proof.
A.1 Formal Security Model
The motivation behind our model is as follows: the standard acceptable notion
of security for public key encryption schemes is indistinguishability against chosen
ciphertext attacks (denoted IND-CCA). Hence, it is natural to require that a policy-
based encryption scheme also satisﬁes this strong notion of security. However, the
deﬁnition of this security notion must be adapted to the policy-based setting. In [5],
Boneh and Franklin extend the IND-CCA model to a stronger security model denoted
IND-ID-CCA. The latter allows the adversary to obtain the private key corresponding
to any identiﬁer of his choice, other than the identiﬁer being attacked. Furthermore,
in the deﬁned IND-ID-CCA model, the adversary is allowed to choose the identiﬁer
on which he wishes to be challenged, while in the standard IND-CCA model, the
adversary is challenged on a randomly chosen public key. In a similar way, our
security model should allow the adversary to obtain a set of credentials fulﬁlling any
policy of his choice, other than the policy on which he is challenged. Furthermore,
the adversary should be allowed to specify the challenge policy.
We deﬁne our security model in terms of an interactive game, played between a
challenger and an adversary. The game consists of ﬁve stages: Setup, Phase-1,
Challenge, Phase-2 and Guess which we describe below.
Setup. On input of a security parameter k, the challenger ﬁrst runs algorithm
Setup to obtain the system public parameters P. Then, the challenger runs al-
gorithm Issuer-Setup once or multiple times to obtain a set of credential issuers
I = {I1, . . . , IN}. Finally, the challenger gives to the adversary the public param-
eters P as well as the public keys of the diﬀerent trusted authorities included in
I.
Phase-1. The adversary performs a polynomial number of oracle queries adaptively
i.e. each query may depend on the replies to the previously performed queries.
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that Phase-1 is over, it gives to the challenger
two equal length messages M0,M1 and a policy Polch on which it wishes to be
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challenged. The challenger picks at random b ∈ {0, 1}, then runs algorithm PolEnc
on input of the tuple (Mb, Polch), and ﬁnally returns the resulting ciphertext Cch
to the adversary.
Phase-2. The adversary performs again a polynomial number of adaptive oracle
queries.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′, and wins the game if b = b′.
During Phase-1 and Phase-2, the adversary may perform queries to two oracles
controlled by the challenger. On one hand, a credential generation oracle denoted
CredGen-O. On the other hand, a policy-base decryption oracle denoted PolDec-
O. While the oracles are executed by the challenger, their input is speciﬁed by the
adversary. The two oracles are deﬁned as follows:
• CredGen-O. On input of a credential Iκ ∈ T and an assertion A ∈ {0, 1}∗, run
algorithm CredGen on input of the tuple (Iκ, A) and return the resulting credential
ς(Rκ, A).
• PolDec-O. On input of C ∈ C, a policy Pol and a set of indices {j1, . . . , jm}, ﬁrst
run algorithm CredGen multiple times to obtain the qualiﬁed set of credentials
ςj1,...,jm(Pol), then run algorithm PolDec on input of the tuple (C,Pol, ςj1,...,jm(Pol))
and return the resulting output.
The oracle queries made by the adversary during Phase-1 and Phase-2 are subject to
two restrictions. On one hand, the adversary is not allowed to obtain a qualiﬁed set
of credentials for the challenge policy Polch. On the other hand, he is not allowed
to perform a query to oracle PolDec-O on a tuple (C,Pol, {j1, . . . , jm}) such that
ϕj1,...,jm(C,Pol) = ϕj1,...,jm(Cch, Polch). In fact, in the policy-based setting, for an
encrypted message with respect to a policy with disjunctions, there is more than
one possible qualiﬁed set of credentials that can be used to perform the decryption.
That is, forbidding the adversary from making decryption queries on the challenge
tuple (Cch, Polch), as in the IND-ID-CCA model, is not suﬃcient anymore. Indeed,
we may have tuples such that (C,Pol) = (Cch, Polch) while ϕj1,...,jm(C,Pol) =
ϕj1,...,jm(Cch, Polch). Decryption queries on such tuples should then be forbidden as
well.
The game described above is denoted IND-Pol-CCA. A formal deﬁnition of chosen
ciphertext security for PBE schemes is given below. As usual, a real function g is
said to be negligible if g(k) ≤ 1f(k) for any polynomial f .
Deﬁnition A.1 The advantage of an adversary A in the IND-Pol-CCA game is
deﬁned to be the quantity AdvA = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |. A PBE scheme is IND-Pol-CCA
secure if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary has a non-negligible advantage
in the IND-Pol-CCA game.
We deﬁne ϕj1,...,jm(C,Pol) to be the information from the ciphertext C and the
policy Pol that is required to correctly perform the decryption of C with respect to
Pol using the qualiﬁed set of credentials ςj1,...,jm(Pol). A concrete example is given
when describing our PBE scheme.
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A.2 Security Results for our Policy-Based Encryption Scheme
In the following, we show that our policy-based encryption scheme (denoted PBE)
is IND-Pol-CCA secure in the random oracle model deﬁned in [3].
Theorem A.2 Our PBE scheme is IND-Pol-CCA secure in the random oracle
model under the assumption that BDHP is hard.
Proof. Theorem A.2 follows from a sequence of reduction arguments that are
summarized in the following diagram:
Our PBE scheme  NewBasicPubhy  BDHP
(1) (2)
IND-Pol-CCA

.........
IND-CCA

.........
(i) Lemma A.3 shows that an IND-Pol-CCA attack on our PBE scheme can be
converted into an IND-CCA attack on the NewBasicPubhy scheme described
in Gal05.
(ii) In [10], algorithm NewBasicPubhy is shown to be IND-CCA secure in the random
oracle model under the assumption that BDHP is hard.
Lemma A.3 stated below uses a function F (.) having a rather unaesthetic expres-
sion. Computing F (qc, qd, q0, N,m∨∧,m∨,m∧) relies on computing the quantity
Υ(X,m∨∧,m∨,m∧), which is deﬁned to be the total number of ’minimal’ policies
written in CDNF, given the upper-bounds (m∨∧,m∨,m∧) and X possible credential-
based conditions. Computing Υ(X,m∨∧,m∨,m∧) is similar, but not exactly the
same as the problems of computing the number of monotone boolean functions of
n variables (Dedekind’s Problem [15]) and computing the number of antichains on
a set {1, . . . , n} [13]. As opposed to these problems, the order of the terms must
be taken into consideration when dealing with our policies. This is a typical, yet
interesting, ’counting’ problem. However, as we do not address exact security in
this paper, we do not elaborate more on the details (improving the tightness of the
reductions is left to future research work).
Lemma A.3 Let A◦ be an IND-Pol-CCA adversary with advantage AdvA◦ ≥ 
when attacking our PBE scheme. Assume that A◦ has running time tA◦ and makes
at most qc queries to oracle CredGen-O, qd queries to oracle PolDec-O as well as
q0 queries to oracle H0. Then, there exists an IND-CCA adversary A• the advan-
tage of which, when attacking the NewBasicPubhy scheme, is such that AdvA• ≥
F (qc, qd, q0, N,m∨∧,m∨,m∧).. Its running time is tA• = O(tA◦).
Due to space limitation, proof of Lemma A.3 is given in the full version of this
paper.
Note. In the particular case where N = m∨∧ = m∨ = m∧ = 1, our PBE scheme
is equivalent to the New-FullIdent scheme of [10]. In this case, our result match
Result 5 of [10].

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